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Abstract ± 238 words 
 
This article examines the unintended consequences of injunctions granted in misuse of 
private information (MPI) disputes.  The MPI action enables successful claimants to obtain 
injunctions, often anonymised, to prevent publication of a story (or parts of it) that infringe 
upon their Article 8 privacy rights.  This article considers cases such as Giggs v News Group 
and PJS v News Group which highlight the challenges of MPI injunctions; they may draw 
additional attention to disputed material, a phenomenon that has been colloquially termed 
WKH µ6WUHLVDQG HIIHFW¶.  It DIIRUGV VSHFLILF DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI µMLJVDZ
LGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶ ZKLFK may result from MPI injunctions that only restrict the publication of 
VSHFLILF SDUWV RI D GLVSXWH VXFK DV WKH FODLPDQW¶V LGHQWLW\  ,W SURFHHGV WR discuss three 
primary reasons for unintended consequences in some MPI cases, including psychological 
reactance, social countering and the possibilities afforded by new online technologies.  The 
article concludes with a close analysis of the recent Supreme Court decision in PJS where the 
judicial response was to modify the problem that MPI injunctions seek to address.  Changing 
the purpose of such injunctions, and therefore the outcomes by which their efficacy is to be 
gauged, enables the courts to justify their continuation in the face of widespread publication 
of private information.  But this reasoning process relies on newly constructed, tenuous 
distinctions between press/Internet dissemination and secrecy/intrusion elements of privacy, 
and it necessarily entails some sacrifice of the wider credibility of law. 
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Jigsaws and Curiosities: The Unintended Consequences in Misuse 
of Private Information Injunctions 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
As the claimant in the recent Supreme Court case of PJS v News Group1 might ruefully 
agree, actions have consequences; some intended, some not.  These latter unintended 
consequences are the concern of this article.  Interest in unintended consequences can be 
traced to an influential article by Merton in the 1930s.2  Here Merton made two claims with 
which judges in misuse of private information (MPI) cases are undoubtedly familiar.  First, 
the rationality of a particular purposive action does not necessarily guarantee the success of 
its outcome. 3   Second, correctly anticipating consequences of any given action will be 
hindered by inherent limitations in human knowledge, the limitations of prediction itself and 
the tendency to overlook remoter or less immediate consequences of a given act.4  Though 
0HUWRQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQVGLGQRWDSSO\WR law specifically, they are highly pertinent to law as a 
rule-based form RI µSXUSRVLYH VRFLDO DFWLRQ¶ used to regulate and effect social change.  
Recognition of the limits of laws to successfully fulfil this function, and its tendency to 
produce unintended results is by no means new.  In The Republic, Plato said of legislators: 
 
µThey make «>ODZV@ then try to improve them, and constantly expect the 
next breach of contract to be the last RQH DQG OLNHZLVH IRU « crimes «, 
because they are unaware that in fact WKH\¶UH VODVKLQJ DZD\ DW D NLQG RI
Hydra [a mythical beast who grows two heads when one is cut off] ¶.5 
 
Such unintended consequences have arisen from misuse of private information (MPI) law.   
MPI is a common law tort6 that rapidly emerged in the decade or so following the enactment 
of the Human Rights Act 1998, constructed from a fusion of traditional breach of confidence 
and ECtHR jurisprudence. 7   MPI disputes primarily involve high profile, µcelebrity¶ 
claimants seeking to protect their Article 8 ECHR privacy rights against media defendants 
relying on the Article 10 right to publish a story or expose about them.  Using MPI judges 
apply a two-stage test, first asking whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of 
                                                          
x Special thanks to Richard Craven at Leicester University for co-convening with Prof Phil Thomas the 
µODZ 	 XQLQWHQGHG FRQVHTXHQFHV¶ VWUHDP RI WKH Socio-Legal Scholars Association 2016 conference at 
which this paper was delivered. 
 
1
 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26. 
2
 5REHUW . 0HUWRQ µ7KH 8QDQWLFLSDWHG &RQVHTXHQFHV RI 3XUSRVLYH 6RFLDO $FWLRQ¶ $PHULFDQ 6RFLRORJLFDO
Review, Vol 1, No 6 (Dec 1936) 894-904. 
3
 Ibid 896. 
4
 Idid 898-903.  Merton also lists values as a factor. 
5
 Plato, The Republic (Oxford 1998) [426e].  
6
 Confirmed in Vidal-Hall v Google [2015] EWCA Civ 311. 
7
 5HEHFFD0RRVDYLDQµ&KDUWLQJWKH-RXUQH\IURP&RQILGHQFHWRWKH1HZ0HWKRGRORJ\¶(,35-
335. 
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privacy in relation to the disputed information, and if so, proceeding to undertake a balancing 
exercise8 between the competing privacy and free expression rights.9 
 
This paper considers the unintended consequences of the development and enforcement of 
MPI law.  It will focus on a specific species of unintended consequence; that of perverse 
incentives.  $FFRUGLQJWR%RXGHQµthere is a perverse effect when two (or more) individuals, 
in pursuing a given objective, generate an unintended state of affairs which may be 
undesirable from the point of view of both or one of them¶10   
 
This article considers perverse incentives in MPI by analysing why injunctions to prohibit the 
dissemination of private information sometimes have the opposite effect, and how judges 
dealing with such cases have responded.  It first considers select examples such as Giggs v 
News Group and the recent PJS v News Group where such unintended consequences played 
out.  These cases highlight the challenges of MPI injunctions; they may draw more attention 
to thH GLVSXWHG PDWHULDO D SKHQRPHQRQ WKDW KDV EHHQ FROORTXLDOO\ WHUPHG WKH µ6WUHLVDQG
HIIHFW¶DVSHUWKH86OLWLJDWLRQLQStreisand v Adelman.  This article affords specific attention 
WR WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI µMLJVDZ LGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶ ZKLFK PD\ UHVXOW IURP 03, LQMXnctions that 
RQO\UHVWULFWWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIVSHFLILFSDUWVRIDGLVSXWHVXFKDVWKHFODLPDQW¶VLGHQWLW\,W
proceeds to discuss three primary reasons for unintended consequences in the cases 
discussed.  It argues that the combination of psychological reactance, social countering and 
the possibilities afforded by new online technologies may cause unintended consequences 
that undermine the core purpose of privacy protecting injunctions.  The article concludes with 
a close analysis of the recent Supreme Court decision in PJS v News Group 11  which 
encapsulates how the courts have responded to unintended consequences in MPI cases.  The 
judicial response has been to modify the problem that MPI injunctions seek to address.  
Changing the purpose of such injunctions, and therefore the outcomes by which their efficacy 
is to be gauged, enables the courts to justify their continuation in the face of widespread 
publication of private information.   
 
 
>@7KHµ*LJJV(IIHFW¶ 
 
 
One feature of MPI law that raises unintended consequences in the form of perverse incentive 
is the granting of privacy-protecting injunctions, including interim injunctions.  The 
proliferation of anonymised injunctions directly paralleled the emergence of MPI.12  Such 
injunctions µ>UHVWUDLQ]  a person from publishing information which concerns the applicant 
and is said WREHFRQILGHQWLDORUSULYDWH«>DQG@WKHQDPHVRIHLWKHURUERWKRIWKHSDUWLHVWR
the proceedings are not stated¶13  In order to obtain an interim injunction ± which preserves 
privacy pending trial ± an applicant must show he is likely to establish that publication should 
                                                          
8
 )RUDQDQDO\VLVRIWKHPHWDSKRURIEDODQFLQJLQ03,FDVHODZVHHµ$-XVW%DODQFHRU-XVW,PEDODQFH"7KH5ROH
RI0HWDSKRULQ0LVXVHRI3ULYDWH,QIRUPDWLRQ¶>@-RXUQDORI0HGLD/DZ9RO-224. 
9
 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73; Murray v Express Newspapers Plc [2008] EWCA 
Civ 446. 
10
  Raymond Boudon, The Unintended Consequences of Social Action (Macmillan Press, 1982, London) 14. 
11
 PJS Supreme Court (n 1). 
12
 /RUG 1HXEHUJHU 05 µ5HSRUW RI WKH &RPPLWWHH RQ 6XSHU-Injunctions: Super-Injunctions, Anonymised 
,QMXQFWLRQV 	 2SHQ -XVWLFH¶  https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Reports/super-injunction-report-20052011.pdf>  (accessed 16 Oct 2016)  
[1.8]-[1.13]. 
13
 Ibid p iv. 
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not be allowed at trial.14  When deciding whether to grant an interim injunction one factor the 
court PXVWFRQVLGHULVµWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHPDWHULDOKDVRULVDERXWWREHFRPHDYDLODEOH
WRWKHSXEOLF¶15 
 
The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 state that though there is a general requirement that legal 
hearings are public, they can be made private, in whole or part, where publicity would defeat 
the object of the hearing, it involves confidential information or is necessary in the interests 
of justice.16  Furthermore, the CPR authorise the courts to protect the identity of any party 
where necessary to protect their interests.17  However, such orders derogate from the usual 
principles of open justice. 18   Any MPI judgment given must provide a comprehensible 
account of the reasons for the decision (in line with principles of open justice), but must also 
be careful not to undermine the aims of any privacy-protecting injunction granted.   
 
As Part 1.2 demonstrates, the ability of such orders to protect information in an online era has 
been called into question by certain cases, and this is partly due to a phenomenon that has 
EHHQFROORTXLDOO\WHUPHGWKHµ6WUHLVDQGHIIHFW¶ 
 
 
[1.1] 7KHµ6treisand Effect¶ 
 
7KLVµHIIHFW¶ emerged from a dispute between Hollywood star Barbara Streisand and Kenneth 
Adelman who runs a small organisation called the California Coastal Records (CCR) Project.  
The latter undertook a project to sequentially photograph and document the full stretch of 
California coastline.  Amongst the 12,000 photographs on the CCR website were images of 
6WUHLVDQG¶VFOLII-top Malibu estate, which the site labelled as such.  Barbara Streisand brought 
an action alleging various privacy violations under Californian law, seeking the somewhat 
audacious sum of $50 million damages and a permanent injunction.  Yet, as news of the legal 
dispute spread, there was a substantial increase in the number of visitors to the CCR website 
to access the disputed SKRWRVRI6WUHLVDQG¶VKRPH  *RRGPDQ-UHMHFWHG6WUHLVDQG¶s privacy 
DUJXPHQWVFODLPLQJµ$Q\LQWUXVLRQRQWKHVHIDFWVLVGHPLQLPXV¶.19 
 
7KH µ6WUHLVDQG HIIHFW¶ is explained in an article in The Economist, 20  and has been 
subsequently been afforded passing attention in certain US law journals.21  The article defines 
WKHµ6WUHLVDQGHIIHFW¶WKXV 
                                                          
14
 Section 12(3) Human Rights Act 1998.  Further detailed guidance on the terms of such injunctions is set out in 
Practice Direction (Interim Non-Disclosure Orders) [2012] 1 WLR 1003.  See also: JIH v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 42, [21].  
15
 Section 12(4)(a)(i) Human Rights Act 1998. 
16
 Rule 39.2(1) & (3), Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
17
 RulH&LYLO3URFHGXUH5XOHVVWDWHVµThe court may order that the identity of any party or witness 
must not be disclosed if it considers non-disclosure necessary in order to protect the interests of that party or 
witness¶  The test for anonymization is whether there is there a general public interest in identifying the 
claimant that justifies curtailing his Article 8 right: Home Secretary of State for Home Department v AP (No 2) 
[2010] UKSC 26, [7] (Lord Rodger).  Applied in Donald v Ntuli [2010] EWCA Civ 1276 [52]; XJA v News 
Group [2010] EWHC 3174 [6]. 
18
 See discussion of the principle of open justice: Lord Neuberger (n 12) [1.17]-[1.35]. 
19
 Streisand v Adelman (2003) Los Angeles Superior Court SC 077 257, p 37. 
<http://www.californiacoastline.org/streisand/slapp-ruling.pdf> (accessed 16 Oct 2016) 
20
 7KH (FRQRPLVW 2QOLQH µ:KDW LV WKH 6WUHLVDQG (IIHFW "¶  $SULO 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-what-streisand-effect> (last 
accessed 16 Oct 2016)  
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µ[It]  describes how efforts to suppress a juicy piece of online information 
can backfire and end up making things worse for the would-be censor.¶22 
 
For this reason tKHµ6WUHLVDQGHIIHFW¶ is a textbook example of perverse incentive; attempts to 
contain or suppress information lead to its wider dissemination.  Yet this dynamic is by no 
means a new phenomenon, as the Spycatcher affair demonstrates. 
 
Spycatcher; Perverse Incentive in the Analogue Era 
The ¶V Spycatcher litigation concerned the controversial memoir of retired MI5 officer 
Peter Wright.  The book included DOOHJDWLRQV WKDW0,KDGµEXJJHGDQGEXUJOHG¶ WKHLUZD\
across London, spied on Prime Minister Harold Wilson and it recounted other forms of 
intrigue and espionage such as assassination attempts.  The book could not be published in 
the UK due to Official Secrets legislation and the terms of :ULJKW¶Vemployment contract.  
But he was based in Tasmania and sought to publish in Australia.   
 
In September 1985 the UK government litigated in the Australian courts for an injunction to 
prevent publication of the book.  This was initially obtained, though ultimately unsuccessful, 
and :ULJKW¶Vpublisher thus undertook arrangements to start publishing the book in the US, 
and later Australia and various other countries.23  In June 1986 The Observer and Guardian 
newspapers reported on the Australian court proceedings and included an outline of the 
Spycatcher allegations.  In response the Attorney-General applied to the English courts 
alleging breach of confidence and obtained interim injunctions against these papers to prevent 
further reporting.  In April 1987 The Independent and other newspapers in the US and 
Australia published articles referring to the allegations.  The Sunday Times obtained 
serialization rights to Spycatcher and published the first instalment on 12 July 1987,  one day 
priRUWRWKHERRN¶V86SXEOLFDWLRQ7KH$WWRUQH\-General brought proceedings for contempt 
of court and The Times was prevented from further serialization.  The Observer and Guardian 
promptly applied to discharge the interim injunction against them on the basis that the 
contents of the book were no longer confidential.  Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C 
discharged the injunctions, acknowledging that modern technologies (rather quaintly, 
µHOHFWURQLFV DQG MXPER MHWV¶ DOORZHG QHws to reach an international audience whilst the 
FRXUW¶VSRZHUVZHUHUHVWULFWHGWRQDWLRQDOERUGHUV+HFRQWLQXHG  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21
 6HHHJ''RKHUW\ µ'RZQORDGLQJ ,QIULQJHPHQW3DWHQW/DZDVD5RDGEORFN WR WKH'3ULQWLQJ5HYROXWLRQ¶
(2012) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 26(1) 353-6/R&DVFLR µ)RUFLQJ(XURSHWR:HDUWKH
Rose-Coloured Google Glass: The Right to Be Forgotten and the Struggle to Manage Compliance Post Google 
SSDLQ¶&ROXPELD-RXUQDORI7UDQVQDWLRQDO/DZ-331, 308-(5RVHQEODWWµ)HDU	/RDWKLQJ
6KDPH6KDPLQJDQG,QWHOOHFWXDO3URSHUW\¶'H3DXO/DZ5HYLHZ-48, 26-27. 
22
 The Economist (n 20).  A range of further examples of the µ6WUHLVDQGHIIHFW¶DUHVHWRXWLQ %%&1HZV µ7KH
3HULOVRI WKH6WUHLVDQG(IIHFW¶ -XO\http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-28562156> (accessed 16 
October 2016).  This article also indicates that the term was coined by Mike Masnick, founder of the Techdirt 
website in 2005. 
23
 Attorney General v Observer Ltd & Others [1990] 1 A.C. 109. 
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 µOnce the news is out by publication in the United States and the 
importation of the book into this country, the law could, I think be 
justifiably accused of being an ass and brought into disrepute if it closed its 
eyes to that reality and sought by injunction to prevent the press or anyone 
else from repeating information which is now freely available to all.  «WKH
court should not make orders which would be ineffective to achieve what 
they set out to do.¶24   
 
Though this decision was later reversed by the House of Lords, copies of Spycatcher started 
trickling into Britain in increasing quantities.  Between August & November 1987 Spycatcher 
featured consistently on the New York Times best-seller list and was published in Canada, 
Ireland and various European countries.  Throughout this time thousands of copies of the 
book filtered into Britain from abroad, at least partly due to the high profile of proceedings.  
Spycatcher allegations were also repeated in English-speaking Danish and Swedish radio 
broadcasts, accessible in the UK.25 
 
At the final trial in December 1987 Scott J discharged the injunctions against the papers on 
the basis the information was now public and no longer secret.26  After various appeals 
Spycatcher reached the House of Lords where the majority Law Lords agreed the injunction 
should be discharged because the information was now public so no further damage could be 
done to the public interest.27  Lord Keith explained that:  
 
µa very substantial number of copies have in fact been imported.  So the 
contents of the book have been disseminated world-wide and anyone in this 
country who is interested can obtain a copy without undue difficulty¶28   
 
Similarly, Lord Goff set out the first of three limiting principles that remain an integral part 
of the doctrine of confidence from which MPI emerged:  
 
µthe principle of confidentiality only applies to information to the extent 
that it is confidential.  In particular, once it has entered what is usually 
called the public domain (which means no more than that the information 
in question is so generally accessible that, in all the circumstances, it 
cannot be regarded as confidential) then, as a general rule, the principle of 
FRQILGHQWLDOLW\FDQKDYHQRDSSOLFDWLRQWRLW¶¶29 
 
As in Streisand v Adelman it seems that the attempt in Spycatcher to supress the information 
fostered a curiosity and stimulated a demand for the book that otherwise may not have 
occurred.  This case also raises the question of whether the act of censorship itself may create 
a demand for specific information rather than the nature and content of the information per 
se.  These propositions are afforded further examination in Part 3.1.  
 
                                                          
24
 Attorney General v Guardian Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 1248, 1269H-1270A. 
25
 For additional details of this factual background see: Spycatcher (n 23) 126-128 (Scott J) 
26
 Ibid (Scott J) 117-174.  Scott J did order the Sunday Times to account for profits due to publication. 
27
 Ibid 258H-259H (Lord Keith); 267B-C (Lord Brightman); 282C, 283C (Lord Goff); 293E-F (Lord Jauncey).  
But see: 271B-C, 276A-G (Lord Griffith, dissenting).  The Law Lords ordered the Sunday Times to account for 
profits accrued from its serialisation of Spycatcher. 
28
 Ibid 254 D-F (Lord Keith) 
29
 Ibid 282C-D.  
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[1.2] 7KHµGiggs Effect¶ 
 
A number of contemporary MPI cases have followed the broad Streisand-Spycatcher 
dynamic.  The earliest high-profile example was the Giggs (formerly CTB) v News Group 
litigation which highlighted an unintended consequence of privacy-protecting injunctions that 
prohibit the dissemination of certain information; that they may draw more attention to the 
disputed material by piquing wider curiosity about it.  As is well known, the dispute involved 
footballer Ryan Giggs who initially obtained an anonymised injunction to prevent publication 
of information relating to an extra-marital affair he had with the second defendant, Imogen 
Thomas.  The sequence of events ± and particularly their timeframe ± provide a fascinating 
case study of perverse incentives in effect. 
 
On 14 April 2011 Eady J granted a temporary anonymised injunction to prevent The Sun 
running a story abRXW WKHDSSOLFDQW¶V extra-marital affair.30  On the same day The Sun ran a 
story revealing that an anonymous footballer had an affair with Imogen Thomas.  On 8 May 
Giggs was named as µCTB¶ on Twitter and some Twitter users started naming him.  
6SHFXODWLRQ DV WR &7%¶V LGHQWLW\ FRQWLQXHG RQ 7ZLWWHU  0XUUD\ ZULWHV that it became 
apparent that µprivacy injunctions were «creating an informational vacuum which users of 
[social networking platforms]  would quickly fill without care for accuracy or the well-being 
of the people they were naming¶31 
 
On 16 May, in a published judgment outlining reasons to date, Eady J upheld the injunction 
on the basis that the claimant would be likely to obtain a permanent injunction at trial.32  
'HVSLWH ZLGHVSUHDG RQOLQH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI *LJJV¶ LGHQWLW\ Eady J explained that in cases 
involving private information the public/private distiQFWLRQLVQRWµEODFNDQGZKLWH¶,QVWHDG
he proposed considering the specific fDFWVRIWKHFDVHDQGGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUµthere remains a 
reasonable expectation of some privacy¶, even where some publication of information has 
occurred.33  On 20 0D\*LJJV¶ ODZ\HUV applied for a Norwich Pharmacal order34 requiring 
Twitter to disclose within 7 days the identities of users who had published his name on the 
site.35  This led to a substantial increase in traffic to the Twitter site which saw a 22% spike in 
visitors, its busiest ever day in the UK.36  Ryan Giggs became the top trending item on 
Twitter, with thousands of users naming Giggs alongside the prefix #IamSpartacus.37  On 22 
                                                          
30
 The 14th April decision and reasons are outlined in Giggs (formerly CTB) v News Group Newspapers Ltd & 
Another [2011] EWHC 1232 [1].    
31
 A Murray, Information Technology Law, The Law & Society, 2nd ed (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 145. 
32
 Giggs 14 April (n 30) [37] 
33
 Emphasis added.  Ibid [28].   
34
 Norwich Pharmacal Company v Customs & Excise [1974] AC 133  
35
 %%& 1HZV 2QOLQH µ)RRWEDOOHU 2EWDLQV 7ZLWWHU 'LVFORVXUH 2UGHU¶  0D\ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-13477811> (accessed 16 Oct 2016); 7KH *XDUGLDQ 2QOLQH ¶7ZLWWHU
)DFHV /HJDO $FWLRQ E\ )RRWEDOOHU RYHU 3ULYDF\¶  0D\ 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/may/20/twitter-sued-by-footballer-over-privacy> (accessed 16 Oct 
2016). 
36
 7KH *XDUGLDQ RQOLQH µ7ZLWWHU7UDIILF 6HHV  6SLNH LQ 5XVK WR )LQG ,GHQWLW\ RI ,QMXQFWLRQ )RRWEDOOHU¶ 
May 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/may/23/twitter-traffic-injunction-footballer> 
(accessed 16 Oct 2016).   
37
 µ%\ WKUHDWHQLQJ 7ZLWWHU XVHUV *LJJV¶ OHJDO WHDP KDG LQDGYHUWHQWO\ WULJJHUHG 7ZLWWHU¶V DXWRLPPXQH UHVSRQVH
NQRZQDV,DP6SDUWDFXV«7KHLGHDLVDVLQWKHFODVVLFPRYLH6SDUWDFXVWRIRUPDVLQJOHJURXSPHDQLQJWKDW
DQDWWDFNRQRQHLVDQDWWDFNRQDOO«E\EDQGLQJWRJHWKHUWKHJURXSGHIHQGWKHXVHUs under threat.¶0XUUD\Q
31) 145. 
8 
 
May The Scottish Herald, not covered by English law, identified Giggs as CTB.38  The 
following day, 23 May, saw two hearings in the case.  First, the defendants applied to vary 
the terms of the order to allow publication of Giggs¶ name which was now in the public 
domain due to widespread publication.  In a 2.30pm judgment Eady J refused this, explaining 
µthe modern law of privacy is not concerned solely with secrets: it is also concerned 
importantly with intrusion¶39  Shortly after 3.30pm the same day, whilst debating injunctions 
in Parliament and thus protected by parliamentary privilege, MP John Hemming named Ryan 
Giggs as CTB40  Immediately following this, the defendants again applied for anonymity to 
be removed.  In a terse judgment Tugendhat J denied the application and UHLWHUDWHG(DG\-¶V
earlier point.  He continued,  
 
µThe fact that tens of thousands of people have named the claimant on the 
internet confirms that the claimant and his family need protection from 
intrusion into their private and family life.  The fact that a question has 
been asked in Parliament seems to me to increase, and not to diminish the 
strength of his case¶41 
 
The dispute lingered on and continued WRDQXQHDV\HQGZKHQ*LJJV¶DFWLRQZDVVWUXFNRXW 
months later due failure to meet court deadlines and the injunction thus no longer had 
effect.42 
 
Giggs v News Group case is a fascinating example of unintended consequences, but other 
MPI cases also illustrate similar difficulties involved in privacy injunctions.  For example, 
around the same time as the Giggs litigation Jeremy Clarkson was revealed as the claimant in 
AMM v HXW43  in broadly similar circumstances, later claiming such injunctions are 
µSRLQWOHVV¶ in an online era. 44   A further example is DIIRUGHG E\ 6LU )UHG *RRGZLQ¶V
unsuccessful attempt to prevent publication of his adulterous affair with a work colleague.  
Goodwin (formerly MNB) was initially granted an anonymised injunction.45  Some weeks 
later, Lord Stoneham on behalf of Lord Oakeshott identified Goodwin as the claimant in a 
parliamentary question.46  The defendant applied to discharge the injunction that same day.  
                                                          
38
 7KH +HUDOG 2QOLQH µ,QWHUQHW 6WRUP DV ,QMXQFWLRQ )RRWEDOOHU ,GHQWLILHG¶  0D\ 
<http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13030446.Internet_storm_as_injunction_footballer_identified/> 
(accessed 16 Oct 2016). 
39
 Emphasis added.  Giggs (formerly CTB) v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1326 [23]. 
40
 +HPPLQJ VWDUWHG D TXHVWLRQ VWDWLQJ µWith about 75,000 people having named Ryan Giggs on Twitter, it is 
REYLRXVO\LPSUDFWLFDEOHWRLPSULVRQWKHPDOODQGZLWKUHSRUWVWKDW*LOHV&RUHQDOVRIDFHVLPSULVRQPHQW¶EHIRUH
being interrupted and admonished by the Speaker.  A number of MPs who followed Hemming in the debate, 
including the Attorney General and Chuka Umunna, criticized his actions.  HC Hansard, vol 528, col 638 (23 
May 2011). 
41
 Giggs (formerly CTB) v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1334 [3] 
42
 Overview of ongoing events following this are set out at Giggs (previously known as CTB) v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 431 [21]->@ +HUH WKH FODLPDQW¶VDSSOLFDWLRQ IRU UHOLHI IURPVWULNHRXWZDV
refused. 
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 [2010] EWHC 2457 
44
 7KH *XDUGLDQ 2QOLQH µ-HUHP\ &ODUNVRQ /LIWV µSRLQWOHVV¶ ,njunction Against Ex-ZLIH¶  2FWREHU 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/oct/27/jeremy-clarkson-lifts-injunction > (accessed 16 Oct 2016).  
See also: 86PDUWWµ7ZLWWHU8QGHUPLQHV6XSHULQMXQFWLRQV¶&RPPV/-139, 136-137. 
45
 Outlined at Goodwin (formerly MNB) v News Group [2011] EWHC 528 [1]-[4] 
46Lord Stoneham stated: µDoes [my noble friend] accept that every taxpayer has a direct public interest in the 
events leading up to the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland? So how can it be right for a super -injunction to 
hide the alleged relationship between Sir Fred Goodwin and a senior colleague? If true, it would be a serious 
breach of corporate governance and not even the Financial Services Authority would be allowed to know about 
it. Hansard HL vol 727, col 1490 (19 May 2011). 
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Tugendhat J did not discharge the injunction, but varied it so that Goodwin could be named 
and maintained anonymity for the female colleague (VBN) with whom he had an affair.47 
 
PJS; the Supreme Court deals with Unintended Consequences 
3-6¶V DWWHPSWV WR UHVWUDLQ SXEOLFation of his extra-marital encounters returned the issue of 
unintended consequences to the fore in April 2016.  PJS had obtained an anonymous 
injunction on 22 January.48  But on 6th April a popular US magazine published the story and 
identified PJS, promptly followed by further publications in America, Canada and Scotland.  
This led to online dissemination of the protected information, with Internet users naming PJS 
on websites and social networking sites.  7KHFODLPDQW¶V solicitors monitored and removed 
the private information where possible.  The respective judgments of the Court of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court provide subtly contrasting narratives of these facts, which correspond to 
their diverging findings.49 
 
On 11 April the House of Commons Speaker, John Bercow, banned MPs from naming PJS in 
parliamentary debate following reports that an MP reveal it.50  The next day News Group 
applied to the Court of Appeal to discharge the injunction,51 DUJXLQJWKDW3-6¶VLGHQWLW\Kad 
entered the public domain and the protective injunction thus no longer served a useful 
purpose.52  The defendants adduced supporting evidence, including numerous online articles 
LGHQWLI\LQJWKHFODLPDQWDQGµ*RRJOHWUHQGV¶JUDSKVLQGLFDWLQJµDPDVVLYHLQFUHDVH¶LQRQOLQH
searches relating to PJS 53  (though these statistics are unfortunately not set out in the 
judgment).  The Court of Appeal reiterated the distinction between public domain issues in 
breach of confidence and misuse of private information, confirming that widespread 
publication need not be fatal to an MPI claimant.54   But it nonetheless found in News 
*URXS¶V IDYRXU DJUHHLQJ WR GLVFKDUJH WKH LQMXQFWLRQ GXH WR ZLGHVSUHDG SXEOLFDWLRQ
Amongst the reasons for this decision, Jackson LJ seemed to indicate that the injunction 
would make little difference to wider coverage of the story,55 DQG WKDWFUXFLDOO\ µthe court 
should not make orders which are ineffective¶56  The approach of the Supreme Court which 
reversed this decision is subjected to further analysis in Part 4. 
 
Counter-examples 
Streisand, Giggs and PJS are very specific (and illuminating) instances of the unintended 
consequences of suppressing material.  But, it must be acknowledged that they are mere 
                                                          
47
 Goodwin (formerly MNB) v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1309 [29].  Goodwin did not oppose 
being named, but opposed discharge of injunction. 
48
 PJS v News Group Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 100, [2016] All ER (D) 248 Jan. 
49
 Contrast the following: PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 393, [15]-[17]; PJS Supreme 
Court (n 1) [7], [9] (Lord Mance). 
50
 7KH 7HOHJUDSK 2QOLQH µ&HOHEULW\ µWKUHHVRPH¶ LQMXQFWLRQ 03 SODQV WR QDPH P\VWHU\ FRXSOH LQ +RXVH RI
&RPPRQV¶  $SULO  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/10/celebrity-threesome-injunction-mp-
plans-to-name-mystery-couple-i/!7KH7HOHJUDSK2QOLQH µ&HOHEULW\,QMXQFWLRQ-RKQ%HUFRZEDQV03VIURP
EUHDNLQJ KLJK SURILOH FRXSOH¶V JDJJLQJ RUGHU¶  $SULO 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/11/john-bercow-bans-mps-from-naming-celebrity-couple-in-
threesome-i/> (accessed 16 Oct 2016). 
51
 PJS Court of Appeal (n 49) [20] 
52
 Ibid [20], [24] 
53
 Ibid [21]-[22].  See also: PJS Supreme Court (n 1) [8]. 
54
 PJS Court of Appeal (n 49) [35]-[39]. 
55
 µIf the interim injunction stands, newspaper articles will continue to appear recycling the contents of the 
redacted judgment and calling upon PJS to identify himself.  Websites discussing the story will continue to pop 
up.  As one is taken down, another will appear.  The process will continue up to the trial date¶Ibid [47](iv) 
56
 Ibid [47](vii). 
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examples and there are many more cases where MPI injunctions appear to have been 
effective.  The identities of most anonymised claimants remain hidden beneath a range of 
cryptic three-letter pseudonyms.  Contostavlos v Medhaun57 indicates that injunctions may 
work effectively in an online context.  Here the claimant sought the continuation of an 
injunction to prevent online dissemination of intimate footage recorded by her former 
boyfriend via various websites, including that of the first defendant.  Tugendat J continued 
the order prohibiting disclosure of the footage or stills.  He also confirmed that it had been 
effective against many of the second defendants, internet users who shared the footage:   
 
µ7KHVWHSVWDNHQE\>WKHFODLPDQW¶VVROLFLWRUVWRVHUYHWKHGHIHQGDQWs]  have 
EHHQVRVXFFHVVIXOWKDWE\WKHWLPH,KHDUGWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ«WKHHYLGHQFH
was that people were complaining that they could not find on the internet a 
copy of the video¶58   
 
Additionally, Mosley v News Group shows that there may be substantial interest in a story 
irrespective of the presence of an injunction.  Here, in the 5 days59 between video footage of 
Mosley¶V OLDLVRQV ZLWK VH[ ZRUNHUV being posted onWR WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V website and his 
application for an interim injunction to remove it, over 1 million people viewed it.60   This led 
WR WKH FRXUW¶V UHIXVDO WR JUDQW DQ LQWHULP LQMXQFWLRQ RQ WKH EDVLV WKDW it would make little 
SUDFWLFDOGLIIHUHQFHDWWKLVVWDJHDQGZRXOGDPRXQWWRDµYDLQJHVWXUH¶.61 
 
Nonetheless, these counter-examples do not detract from the fact that, in certain cases, 
privacy protecting injunctions are ineffective, or may even seem to have opposite effects to 
those intended. 62   One feature of MPI cases that arguably exacerbates such unintended 
consequences is the partial nature of injunctions granted.  Orders only partially restrict or 
censor63 a story, meaning that select facts concerning disputes will be publicised via the 
judgment and/or injunction terms.  But anonymising a claimant or restricting parts of a 
disputed story may lead WR LQFUHDVHGDQG LQWUXVLYHVSHFXODWLRQDQGµMLJVDZLGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶  
It is to this phenomenon that discussion now turns.  
 
 
[2] Injunctions & Jigsaws 
 
 
As outlined at Part 1, in order to uphold principles of open justice judges issue orders that 
restrict information about the parties and the specifics of disputes no more than necessary in 
order to preserve their Art 8 privacy right.  Such µSDUWLDO LQMXQFWLRQV¶ UHVWULFW RQO\ VHOHFW
IHDWXUHVRIDGLVSXWHVXFKDVWKHSDUWLHV¶QDPHVRUFHUWDLQGHWDLOs of a story.  In some cases 
                                                          
57
 [2012] EWHC 850 
58
 Ibid [27]. 
59
 The defendant published its story on 30th March and the claimant applied for an injunction on 4th April: Mosley v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 687 [1], [3]. 
60
 Evidence indicated that the online article was accessed approximately 435,000 times and the footage was 
accessed over 1,420,000 times: ibid [7]-[8].  
61
 Ibid [34].   
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 Smartt (n 44) 137. 
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-2OVRQ	9(VVHVµ7KH6RFLDO3V\FKRORJ\RI&HQVRUVKLS¶LQ
Interpreting Censorship in Canada (eds: Klaus Petersen & Allan C Hutchinson) (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1999) 268.   
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these partial restrictions have, paradoxically, led to intrusive speculation and mis-
identification of the relevant claimant.  Over the course of 2011, various high profile 
individuals were incorrectly named as being involved in MPI litigation, including: Jemima 
Khan, Ewan McGregor and Gaby Logan.  This phenomenon is understood with reference to 
the metaphor of a jigsaw. 64   In Donald v Ntuli the Court of Appeal defined jigsaw 
identification as:  
 
µWKH risk that anonymization can give rise to « ZKHUHE\ DQRQ\PL]DWLRQ
may be undermined by correctly identifying someone as a result of relating 
separate snippets of information or, equally unfortunately, it may lead to 
the wrong person being identified by the media misaligning the snippets.¶65 
 
This statement acknowledges that jigsaw identification can be an unintended and unwelcome 
consequence of the anonymization process.  As the court in Goodwin explained, the various 
VHSDUDWHµVQLSSHWV¶RILQIRUPDWLRQPD\EHSXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHDQGPD\QRWQHFHVVDULO\LGHQWLI\
a claimant.  But the alignment of these µpieces¶ may undermine an LQMXQFWLRQEHFDXVHµThe 
conjunction of publicly available information with the report of proceedings may well lead to 
µWZR DQG WZR¶ EHLQJ SXW WRJHWKHU¶66  As Solove and Schwartz have noted (in a different 
context) the risk of non-personally identifiable information being pieced together to produce 
personally identifiable information increases with the existence of technologies like the 
internet and µVNLOIXO *RRJOHUV¶67   This risk requires the courts to carefully consider the 
content of their judgments which may provide information that could contribute to the 
µMLJVDZLGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶RIthe party the court is trying to protect, as recently acknowledged by 
Laing J in AMC v News Group.68  But the issue of jigsaw identification has also led the courts 
to experiment with the terms and scope of privacy-protecting injunctions when attempting to 
minimise such risks.  First, they considered the so-FDOOHGµVXSHU¶-injunction option.  Second, 
they have assessed which specific parts of a story are best restricted to minimise the risk of 
jigsaw identification.   
 
Avoiding the Jigsaw; Super-Injunctions 
µ6uper¶-injunctions have often been confused with anonymised injunctions but differ from 
that latter in one crucial respect; as well as preventing publication of private information 
about an applicant they also restrain publicising the very existence of the order and 
proceedings.  In MPI cases they were rarely granted and then, only on a temporary basis.69  
But the cases of DFT v TDF 70 and Donald v Ntuli71  involved claimants arguing that a 
µVXSHU¶-injunction was necessary to prevent jigsaw identification and protect their identity 
(and thus their Art 8 privacy right).  In the former case, the applicant argued that Sharp J 
should continue a previously granted super-injunction LQ RUGHU WR SUHYHQW WKH µGULS GULS¶
                                                          
64
 The term was used by Sir David Calcutt QC, Report of the Committee on Privacy & Related Matters (Cm 1102, 
HMSO, 1990), [7.49]; recommendation 8 (p 75). 
65
 Emphasis added.  Donald v Ntuli (n 17) [55].  Similar points regarding anonymization and jigsaw identification 
were reiterated in: ZYT & BWE v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWHC 1162, [15].   
66
 Goodwin (n 45) [33]. 
67
 36FKZDUW]	'6RORYH µ7KH3,,3UREOHP3ULYDF\	D1HZ&RQFHSWRI3HUVRQDOO\,GHQWLILDEOH ,QIRUPDWLRQ¶
(2011) 86 NYUL Rev 1814, 1842-1845. 
68
 AMC & KLJ v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWHC 2361 [4].  See also: Goodwin v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 [148] (Tugendhat J). 
69
 Lord Neuberger (n 12) iv.   
70
 DFT v TDF [2010] EWHC 2335  
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process72 of jigsaw identification which would defeat the purpose of the action.  Pointing to 
recent incidents, he argued publication of the injunction 
 
µwill, inevitably, lead to press and internet speculation as to the identity of 
the applicant.  Such speculation will itself cause the applicant distress and 
will interfere with his Art 8 rights.  Such speculation risks breaches of the 
injunction taking place in forums on the internet. ¶73   
 
Sharp J found that the µVXSHU LQMXQFWLRQ¶ HOHPHQW of the order was not necessary,74 though 
otherwise continued the anonymised order in its existing form.  Similar arguments by the 
claimant in Donald v Ntuli were rejected by the Court of Appeal as µXQSHUVXDVLYH¶ DV an 
anonymity provision would provide adequate protection against such identification.75  
 
 
Avoiding the Jigsaw; Anonymise or Restrict Facts? 
Another series of cases illustrates WKHFRXUWVWU\LQJWRGHFLGHZKHWKHUDFODLPDQW¶VSULYDF\LV
best served by protecting his identity or by restraining publication of the details of a dispute.  
It should be noted that, in any event, information such as intimate details of sexual activity 
and photographs are viewed as particularly intrusive and will invariably be restricted 
LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHSDUWLHV¶DQRQ\PLVDWLRQ76  But many MPI disputes involve splitting stories 
LQWRµGLVFUHWHSDUWV¶DQGXQGHUWDNLQJWKHEDODQFLQJH[Hrcise in relation to each one to decide 
which parts are protectable.  Some cases indicate that the publication of certain facts, such as 
marital status77 or job description78 may be disputed by claimants where such facts could 
potentially facilitate the process of jigsaw identification.  However, the court may decide that 
an outline of dispute can be provided alongside naming the claimant if providing both will 
not compromise the specifically private information.79  
 
The potential approaches were considered in JIH.  The claimant argued that the court could 
either allow the nature of the disputed information to be disclosed and anonymise the 
claimant or it could order the claimant to be named and restrict identification of the disputed 
information.80  The Court of Appeal broadly accepted the binary choice discussed by the 
parties81 and concluded that JIH should retain anonymity and that general information about 
the disputed material should be published in the judgment.82  It therefore provided an outline 
of the dispute confirming (the now rather familiar narrative) that the claimant was a well-
NQRZQ VSRUWVPDQ ZKR KDG D OLDLVRQ ZLWK µ==¶ ZKLOVW KH ZDV LQ DQRWKHU UHODWLRQVKLp and 
VRXJKWWRSURKLELWSXEOLFDWLRQRILQIRUPDWLRQWKDWµ==¶KDGSURYLGHGWR7KH6XQ  The court 
suggested that the public interest would be better served by outlining the facts of the dispute 
to help the public to better understand the reasons for such decisions and address concerns 
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 DFT (n 70) [26]-[27]. 
73
 Emphasis added.  Ibid [29]. 
74
 Ibid [33], [39]. 
75
 Though the anonymity feature of the order was also ultimately discharged here.  Donald v Ntuli (n 17) [46], [1], 
[43]-[44] 
76
 See, e.g.: Theakston v MGN [2002] EWHC 137; Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers [2013] EWHC 24. 
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 NEJ v Helen Wood [2011] All ER (D) 218 [11], [14], [23]-[24]. 
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 Goodwin (n 45) [15]-[16], [3], [18]-[19], [37], [42].  See also: Goodwin (n 68) [146], [120]-[121], [112].   
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about the rise of such orders.83  It DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWDQRQ\PL]DWLRQULVNHGµunintentionally 
HQFRXUDJLQJ¶DWWHQWLRQDQGUXPRXUDERXWWKLUGSDUWLHVEXWLGHQWLI\LQJWKHFODLPDQWZDVµPRUH
OLNHO\¶WRUHVXOWLQVSHFXODWLRQRUGHGXFWLRQDERXWZKDWNLQGRILQIRUPDWLRQKHZDVWU\LQJWR
supress.  IWZHQWRQWRVD\WKDWµsuch speculation could be even more damaging to JIH than 
if no injunction had been granted at all¶84  This indicates judicial acceptance that such 
LQMXQFWLRQVULVNXQLQWHQGHGµXQLQWHQWLRQDO¶HIIHFWV7KH&RXUWRI$SSHDO seemed to accept 
that there will be public speculation in any event; whether this is exacerbated by or primarily 
due to litigation is left open.  But the implication is that people will be inclined to fill the 
µLQIRUPDWLRQDOYDFXXP¶SURGXFHGE\DQLQMXQFWLRQZKHWKHUDQDPHRUWKHJHQHUDOIDFWVRID
dispute are restricted.  The court thus saw its task as tailoring the injunction to try and 
manage or minimise the (inevitable?) speculation and related possibility that elements of the 
story might be pieced together, thus undermining the privacy-protecting purpose of the 
injunction. 
 
So it seems that the partial information concerning MPI cases which must be published to 
meet the requirements of open justice may somehow contribute to speculation or curiosity 
about the restricted parts that remain protected.  But, as noted at Part 1.2, most MPI 
injunctions remain effective, with the unintended consequences cases proving to be 
anomalies, albeit highly telling ones.  What were the specific features of these anomalous 
cases that contributed to such unintended consequences?  What distinguishes these cases 
from other successful attempts to restrict information? 
 
 
[3] Why Unintended Consequences? 
 
 
From the survey of caselaw in Parts 1-2 it seems that three crucial factors are at play when 
information-protecting injunctions result in unintended consequences.  These three factors - 
psychological reactance, social-political countering and technological developments - can 
overlap, and may have a cumulative effect in certain cases.   
 
 
[3.1] The Allure of the Banned 
 
MPI injunctions aimed at protecting privacy may, paradoxically, undermine privacy by 
producing perverse incentives in two ways.  First, reporting of the existence of legal 
proceedings will draw public attention to the fact that someone is going to great length and 
expense to suppress some form of private information.  Second, providing the bare outline of 
WKHIDFWVRIDGLVSXWHZKLOVWUHVWULFWLQJFHUWDLQµLWHPV¶RILQIRUPDWLRQLQFOXGLQJDFODLPDQW¶V
identity) may fuel curiosity and speculation, leading people to attempt to fill the 
LQIRUPDWLRQDOµJDSV¶ 
 
:KDWWKLVDUWLFOHWHUPVµWhe allure of the banned¶ is arguably a long-standing strand of folk 
SV\FKRORJ\DQGLWVURRWVFDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWRWKHELEOLFDOWDOHRI$GDPDQG(YH¶VWDVWLQJRI
the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden.  Yet this folk psychology is supported by historical 
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examples 85  and select empirical studies that have analysed the effects of censorship on 
audience attitudes.  The findings of such studies have significant implications for MPI 
injunctions.  They confirm that the act of censorship tends to instigate two responses in 
individuals who are subjected to it.  First, it may lead to the subject to change their attitude 
towards greater agreement with the censored communication. 86   But second, and more 
significantly, it is likely to lead to an increased desire to hear the communication,87 termed 
µWKH ERRPHUDQJ¶ HIIHFW E\ 2OVRQ DQG (VVHV 88   These observed responses to censorship 
VXSSRUWµUHDFWDQFHWKHRU\¶ZKLFKSURSRVHV that:   
 
µZKHQDSHUVRQ¶VIUHHGRPWRSHUIRUPDSDUWLFXODUEHKDYLRXULVWKUHDWHQHG
or eliminated, he experiences a motivational state which is directed toward 
safeguarding or restoring the freedom in question¶89 
 
Worchell et al found that censorship can arouse reactance in an audience, and, crucially, this 
occurred irrespective of the reasons why material was censored90 or WKHµDWWUDFWLYHQHVV¶RIWKH
censor.  
 
These studies confirm that censorship can produce the opposite consequences to those 
intended by the censor,91 and provide likely explanations as to why is.  Their findings are 
especially significant to MPI because they confirm that the very act of censorship can foster a 
desire to know, irrespective of the content of the supressed material or the congency of 
reasons justifying the prohibition.  This, in turn, casts (further) doubt on recurring judicial 
depictions of tabloid consumers as prurient, prying RU D µSDUWLFXODU¶ UHDGHUVKLS92 and upon 
whether such voyeurism is always their sole, dominant ± or even conscious - motivation.  It 
also raises the possibility that injunctions may exacerbate or contribute to this very culture 
that judges implicitly denigrate.  Despite judicial scepticism towards the voyeurism of the 
tabloid-consuming (and online) public, curiosity should perhaps also be acknowledged as a 
widespread human response to MPI cases.  This was given fleeting acknowledgment when 
the Court of Appeal in PJS quoted the following passage from The Observer:   
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µHuman inquisitiveness is such that thousands more people have probably 
VHDUFKHG IRU WKLV VWRU\ « WKDQ ZRXOG KDYH SDLG WR UHDG LW LQ WKH Sun on 
Sunday.¶93  
 
This highlights one particularly interesting feature of MPI judgments: the gaps or absences 
therein; what they tell, what they do not, and the effects this generates.  Any reader of MPI 
FDVHV ZKR KDV IRXQG WKHPVHOYHV FDVXDOO\ PHQWDOO\ µMLJVDZLQJ¶ SRVVLEOH JDSV LQFOXGLQJ
FODLPDQWV¶LGHQWLWLHVLOOXVWUDWHVWKLVDFWLYHKXPDQcuriosity at play.  Of course, the claim that 
curiosity (about identities or missing facts) is a human and, it seems, not uncommon response 
to MPI cases, is not to assert that everyone necessarily has D µULJKW WR NQRZ¶ private 
information or, indeed, to engage in moral witch-hunts.  But this response to censored 
information, especially partially censored stories, does pose an innate challenge to the 
effective enforcement of MPI law that should be acknowledged.  And this enduring human 
quality of curiosity ± the desire to know, which is lauded in other contexts - may be one 
reason why MPI injunctions can never be infallible, or at least not in every case. 
 
 
[3.2] Countering 
 
µ&RXQWHULQJ¶ LV D VHFRQGVLJQLILFDQW factor that arguably led to unintended consequences in 
MPI cases.  It seems that more than curiosity was at play in the disputes outlined in Part 1.  
There is also evidence of a rebellion, a kick-back or defiance of sorts.  Fine identifies 
µFRXQWHULQJ¶ DV RQH RI IRXU ZD\V LQ ZKLFK Volutions to issues may generate further 
XQLQWHQGHGSUREOHPV&RXQWHULQJRFFXUVZKHUHµsocial problems generate a pitched battle 
between opponents who hold dramatically different values and beliefs¶ DQG )LQH FLWHV
abortion as an example.94  This counter-movement between opposing interests was arguably 
at play in the cases discussed, acting to polarise the disputes.  In particular, the actions of 
three groups in defiance of injunctions represent vital instances of countering.   
 
First, countering is arguably at play when media organisations based outside of the English 
FRXUWV¶ MXULVGLFWLRQ SXEOLVK WKH YHU\ LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW LQMXQFWLRQV VHHN WR SURKLELW  )RU
example, in Spycatcher and PJS, there was widespread international publication across North 
America and beyond.  But even closer to home, the Scottish press has published the identities 
of Giggs and PJS north of the border raising logistical problems and acutely highlighting the 
concrete geographical limitations of the reach of English injunctions.  It thus seems that in 
WKHVH FDVHV WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO PHGLD PD\ KDYH SOD\HG D µFRXQWHULQJ¶ UROH  7KH LQVWLWXWLRQDO
ethos of the press strongly favours free expression values which it sees itself as upholding.95  
The notion that wealthy, powerful individuals VKRXOG EH DEOH WR FRQFHDO µZURQJGRLQJ¶ E\
censoring what the media can publish is an anathema to this position.  This is particularly the 
case in the US where, as the courts in Spycatcher acknowledged, the constitution places 
prime emphasis on free expression by virtue of the First Amendment,96 and where privacy-
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protecting injunctions of the MPI variety are culturally alien.  US media groups arguably 
publish for these reasons and, of course, because they can. 
 
A second group that arguably demonstrates the effects of countering in action is the Members 
of Parliament who have intervened in certain cases.  MPs in parliamentary debates named 
parties in direct breach of injunctions in Giggs and Goodwin, and would have done so in PJS 
but for the intervention of the Speaker.  The direct defiance of these MPs is also said to be 
motivated by concerns about free expression,97 arguably further demonstrating a basic clash 
or conflict of values.98  Finally, the largest group ± the community of Internet users ± also 
demonstrates countering in action, particularly in Streisand, PJS and especially Giggs.  The 
rapid proliferation of the #Iamspartacus handle in the latter case indicates a showdown 
between members of the web community, where a free e[SUHVVLRQµLQIRUPDWLRQZDQWVWREH
IUHH¶ HWKRV SUHYDLOV DQG WKe concerns of an individual seeking to exert control over what 
others know about him.  
 
The actions of these three groups do suggest forms of countering or defiance at play.  They 
hold political values and outlooks that directly oppose the censorship implemented by 
injunctions, and their reactions contribute to the unintended problems such injunctions 
generate.  Though such defiance has been condemned for its blatant disregard of privacy 
values or the rule of law more generally, 99  cases such as Spycatcher and Trafigura 100 
demonstrate that countering can also be sign of a healthy arena of public discussion, which, 
according to Mill, entailed conflict, collision and resistance of opposing views.101  
 
 
[3.3] The Liquidity of Online Information 
 
The third and final factor contributing to the unintended consequences of privacy injunctions 
is the Internet and associated information technologies.  The specific characteristics of the 
Internet as a medium act to exacerbate the issues.  Elsewhere I have drawn upon the work of 
Lash102 and Castells,103 both of whom offer insights into the nature of information in the 
Internet era.  They suggest that internet technologies have resulted in information becoming 
intangible in nature and detached from physical copies such as individual books or 
QHZVSDSHUV,QIRUPDWLRQLVQRZKLJKO\PRELOHPRYLQJUDSLGO\DQGXQSUHGLFWDEO\LQµIORZV¶
resulting in spatial and temporal compression. 104   These three related characteristics of 
temporal compression, spatial compression and fluidity were particularly influential in MPI 
unintended consequences cases, and are now discussed in turn.   
 
The Part 1 cases aptly illustrate that, though the challenges of restricting information are by 
no meDQV QHZ WKH\ DUH LQWHQVLILHG E\ WKH ,QWHUQHW¶V FDSDFLW\ WR HQDEOH LQIRUPDWLRQ WR EH
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widely communicated instantaneously via decentralised networks.  For example, in 
Spycatcher the analogue process of dissemination unfurled over a period of weeks and 
months, with physical copies filtering into the country.  Yet with digital technologies such 
time-frames are significantly compressed into days or even hours.  For example, Max 
0RVOH\¶VDSSOLFDWLRQ IRUDQ LQWHULP LQMXQFWLRQZLWKLQGD\VRI WKHGHIHQGDQW¶V publication 
was unsuccessful because of the sheer scale of online dissemination in that short period.105  
The Giggs affair provides a further salient example of the speed with which information can 
EHVSUHDGLQDPDWWHURIKRXUV7KH,QWHUQHW¶VWHPSRUDOFRmpression is particularly relevant 
to MPI because of its interaction with the psychological reactance response outlined above.  
Olson and Esses note other potential responses to censorship which entail the compliance of 
individuals.106  But they suggest that reactance might be an immediate response to the act of 
censorship, with compliance responses coming later:  
 
µReactance theory applies when people perceive strong external forces 
restricting their freedom.  Such perceptions may be particularly likely 
when censorship is initially imposed¶107 
 
If this hypothesis is proved correct, it has implications for audience reactance in an online 
world where technology enables the instantaneous sharing of restricted information.  It 
suggests that by the time the reactance response passes, the censored information will have 
been widely shared and accessed. 
 
Linked to temporal compression, Internet technologies enable information to move immense 
distances and traverse boundaries, including those of the nation state, with great ease.  The 
impact of this on legal issues was acknowledged in Martinez where the CJEU cited Castells 
in its consideration of jurisdiction issues.108  The contrast between the global physical reach 
of the Internet and the geographically-limited jurisdiction of English courts is acutely 
highlighted, and sometimes acknowledged, in MPI case law.  As Spycatcher and PJS 
illustrate, the English courts have no jurisdiction over what American or other international 
PHGLD JURXSV SULQW EURDGFDVW RU GLVVHPLQDWH RQOLQH  %XW FUXFLDOO\ WKH ODZ¶V SK\VLFDO
dominion also reaches its limits over protected territories closer to home, with Scotland and 
Parliament representing physical locations where restricted information can be publicised 
with impunity.  Irrespective of the cogency of reasons justifying privacy-protecting 
injunctions, such absurdity inevitably impacts upon their credibility (and that of the law more 
generally). 
 
Finally, the fluid, flowing and unpredictable nature of information on the Internet contributes 
to the unintended consequences of MPI injunctions because it makes information more 
difficult to manage.  Occasional use of the liquidity metaphor is apparent in MPI judgments, 
for example in UHIHUHQFHV WR µEXUVW GDPV¶109  or the common judicial mis-reading of the 
ancient tale of King Canute.110  In Mosley Eady J warned that: 
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µThe court should guard against slipping into playing the role of King 
Canute.  Even though an order may be desirable for the protection of 
SULYDF\ « WKHUH PD\ FRPH VRPH SRLQW ZKHUH LW ZRXOG VLPSO\ VHUYH QR
XVHIXOSXUSRVHDQGZRXOGPHUHO\EH«DEUXWXPIXOPHQ>DQHPSW\WKUHDW@
It is inappropriate for the court to make vain gestures¶111 
 
The implicit casting of digital era information as a tide that cannot be held back or controlled 
reflects fundamental characteristics identified by Castells and Lash.  In short, and as MPI 
FDVH ODZ DSWO\ GHPRQVWUDWHV µ%HFDXVH µ,QIRUPDWLRQ ZDQWV WR EH IUHH¶ LW SRVHV PDMRU
challenges for those who wish to tightly control or monopolise it in the Information Age¶112 
 
The three factors discussed in this part ± audience reactance, social countering and the 
liquidity of online information - provide reasons why privacy injunctions sometimes create 
perverse incentives in certain cases.  Judicial responses to such unintended consequences in 
MPI should thus be viewed in light of these factors. 
 
 
[4] Unintended Consequences: The Supreme Court Responds 
 
 
Judicial responses to the unintended consequences of MPI injunctions are epitomised in the 
Supreme CouUW¶V PJS judgment.  Here the Law Lords employed two crucial distinctions, 
analysed in this section, that the Court of Appeal and the dissenting Lord Toulson did not 
accept.  First, they constructed a distinction between newspaper and online publication of 
private information.  Second, they distinguished between two aspects of privacy; secrecy and 
intrusion.  Drawing these distinctions enabled the Law Lords to marginalise the clear, 
widespread GLVVHPLQDWLRQRIWKHFODLPDQW¶VLGHQWLty despite the injunction.  Doing so justified 
the continuation of that injunction and, not insignificantly, arguably allowed the law to claim 
success.  
 
 
[4.1] Press v Online Distinction  
 
/RUG0DQFH¶VOHDGLQJ judgment in PJS113 indicated that assessing disclosure should not be a 
narrow quantitative issue, and instead SODFHG UHSHDWHG HPSKDVLV RQ WKH µTXDOLWDWLYHO\
GLIIHUHQW¶QDWXUHRI,QWHUQHWDQGSUHVVGLVVHPLQDWLRQRISULYDWHinformation.114  Though these 
differences were not afforded specific, sustained examination, three broad distinctions 
seemed to be influential.  First, Lord Mance made certain passing claims about the nature of 
SUHVV FRYHUDJHGHSLFWLQJ LW DV D µPHGLD VWRUP¶115  Judges repeatedly employ this common 
metaphor in relation to press coverage but not the Internet, suggesting violent, turbulent, 
ominous, even dangerous characteristics in the former that are not present in the latter.  Lord 
Neuberger also touched upon a related characteristic of press coverage; its tendency to record 
SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ µLQH\H-FDWFKLQJKHDGOLQHVDQGVHQVDWLRQDO WHUPV¶116  Yet it is not clear 
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why online coverage might not also SRVVHVV YRODWLOH µVWRUP¶-like qualities and/or use 
sensational forms of presentation.  The Law Lords may have been alluding to the general 
hounding by groups of journalists and photographers that can accompany press coverage of a 
story.  But, if so, this dimension was not clearly outlined or articulated, though it is discussed 
further below.  
 
Second, there are subtle indications that the Law Lords viewed press coverage as somehow 
more concrete and lasting compared to online coverage.  Lord Mance claimed that allowing 
SUHVVSXEOLFDWLRQRI3-6¶VLGHQWLW\ZRXOGDGGDQµin some respects more enduring dimension 
to the existing invasions of privacy being perpetrated on the internet¶117  Lord Mance did not 
articulate why press exposure would entail more permanent or enduring coverage and, by 
implication, the net more ephemeral.  It is unclear whether this is an allusion to press 
hounding or the nature of the press medium itself.  If a reference to the latter, such a 
proposition is by no means uncontested.  Contrast this claim, for example, with the comments 
of MacDonald J in H v A, who cast the respective longevities of press and Internet 
publication in opposite terms, referring to:  
 
µWKH DJH RI WKH ,QWHUQHW ZKHUH WRGD\¶V news story no longer becomes 
WRPRUURZ¶VGLVFDUGHGILVKDQGFKLSZUDSSHUEXWUDWKHUUHPDLQVDFFHVVLEOH
in electronic form to those with the requisite search terms¶118   
 
7KLV YLHZ FRQWUDGLFWV /RUG 0DQFH¶V FODLPV GHSLFWLQJ WKH ,QWHUQHW DV WKH PRUH SHUPDQHQW 
concrete medium, and press coverage as more transient. 
 
Third, Lord Mance briefly pointed to specific features of the Internet that qualitatively 
distinguish online from press dissemination.  For example, ZLWKWKH,QWHUQHWµthose interested 
in a prurient story can, if they try, probably read about the identities of those involved and in 
some cases about the detail of the conduct, according to where they may find it on the 
internet¶119  So an important distinction between press and online publication is that online 
material must be actively sought.  This claim is prima facie justifiable in that, unlike press 
publication, the Internet does not involve prominently displayed front-page headlines for 
passers-by to see.  Yet this should arguably viewed in light of the ease with which online 
material can be accessed (even with the PJS injunction in place) and the immense quantitative 
reach of the Internet, discussed below.  A further, and highly significant feature of the 
,QWHUQHW WKDW /RUG 0DQFH LGHQWLILHG LV µthe parallel ± and in probability significantly 
uncontrollable ± world of the internet and social media¶120  7KLVKHFRQFHGHGZDVµthe only 
consideration militating in favour of discharging the injunction¶  7KLV WHOOLQJ VWDWHPHQW
represents an acknowledgment of the limits of law in an online context, suggesting that 
µVWRUP¶-like conditions may extend into online media coverage.  Ultimately, this brief but 
highly revealing acknowledgement perhaps highlights the most significant difference 
between the press and internet as far as the law is concerned; the former, being fixed in a 
SK\VLFDO VSDFH ZLWKLQ WKH FRXUW¶V MXULsdiction, can readily be made subject to an order, 
whereas Internet communications, for the reasons outlined in Part 3.3, will prove far harder to 
police.  This is arguably the most persuasive of the various examples set out by the Law 
Lords in support of their press-Internet distinction.  Yet this reason relates to the practical 
efficacy and enforceability of law rather than core privacy concerns per se. 
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In light of the tenuousness of the main reasons underlying the press-Internet qualitative 
distinction, one must question whether it is necessary or appropriate.  Lord Toulson rejected 
the distinction drawn by the majority,121 arguing that s.12(4) HRA requires the court to have 
regard to the extent to which information is available to the public irrespective of the 
medium: 
 
 µIf the information is in wide, general circulation from whatever source or 
combination of sources, I do not see that it should make a significant 
difference whether the medium of the intended publication is the internet, 
print journalism or broadcast journalism.  The world of public information 
is interactive and indivisible¶122   
 
Quantitative distinctions  
In emphasising qualitative distinctions between the Internet and press, the Law Lords 
disregarded the traditional quantitative view of dissemination, a strategy intrinsically linked 
to their marginalisation of secrecy discussed at Part 4.2.  However, despite indicating that the 
QXPEHURISHRSOHDZDUHRI3-6¶VLGHQWLW\ZDVLPPDWHULDOsome brief quantitative distinctions 
between the respective reaches of the press and Internet did also feature LQ WKH/DZ/RUGV¶
reasoning.  For example, Lord Mance claimed that newspaper publication of the PJS story 
would be accompanied by photographs of the appellant and his family, quoting with approval 
a passage from the Leveson Report which stated WKDWµPDVVFLUFXODWLRQ¶RISKRWRV 
 
µmultiplies and magnifies the intrusion, not simply because more people 
will be viewing the images, but also because more people will be talking 
about them.  Thus the fact of publication inflates the apparent 
QHZVZRUWKLQHVV«E\SODFLQJWKHPmore firmly within the public domain 
and at the top of the news agenda¶123  
  
/RUG0DQFH¶Vuse of this passage seemed to suggest that the press enjoys an extended reach 
because more people will see (presumably generic rather than intimate) photos of the parties, 
DQG WKLVZLOO VRPHKRZSURPSWPRUH µZDWHU-FRROHU¶JRVVLS WKDQ the basic story in isolation.  
This proposition is highly speculative.  Alternatively, Lord Mance could have been alluding 
to the paparazzi photography that sometimes accompanies press coverage of stories.  This 
practice has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights124 and forms a more 
convincing basis for distinguishing press and Internet coverage.  However the passage does 
not explicitly refer to paparazzi photography, and furthermore it does not articulate why such 
accompanying photos lead more people to discuss the story, or why they SODFH LW µPRUH
ILUPO\¶LQWKHSXEOLFGRPDLQ 
 
Lord Neuberger also afforded passing attention to the quantitative aspects of dissemination.  
He dealt with claims that that 20-25% of the population already knew the identity of PJS by 
optimistically focussing on the counter-point that 75% thus remained unaware of it.125  At 
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one level he was correct to point out that this represents a minority of the populace, albeit a 
significant one.  But nevertheless, Lord Neuberger significantly underplayed the statistics 
here.  Even 20-25% of the British population (approximately 12.5 to 15.7 million people)126 
is a figure around 10 times higher than the sales figures for even the highest-circulation 
newspapers in England.  For example, May 2015 figures indicated that the highest-selling 
newspapers were the Daily Mail (average circulation of 1,650,00) and The Mail on Sunday 
(average circulation of around 1,500,000).127 
 
Summary 
The reasons informing the /DZ /RUGV¶ TXDOLWDWLYH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ SUHVV Dnd Internet 
dissemination were mostly tenuous and contestable, a proposition supported by Lord 
7RXOVRQ¶V DOWHUQDWLYH ILQGLQJ WKDW SXEOLF LQIRUPDWLRQ LV LQGLYLVLEOH  Furthermore, the 
quantitative approach to confidentiality was marginalised and dismissed.  Yet even when it 
was briefly addressed, there was a tendency to underplay the extent of Internet dissemination 
and amplify the quantity of press dissemination in the face of clear evidence to the contrary.  
Yet despite such weaknesses, the press-online divide formed a necessary part of the Law 
/RUGV¶VWUDWHJ\of modifying the problem they were faced with solving. 
 
 
[4.2] From Secrecy to Intrusion: Changing the Problem 
 
Fine identifies latent failures in solutions to problems as an example of unintended 
consequences.128  Each MPI injunction is an attempted solution to a problem.  But in order to 
determine its success or failure we must identify and articulate the precise problem that such 
an inMXQFWLRQLVDWWHPSWLQJWRVROYH ,QEDVLFWHUPVWKHLQMXQFWLRQ¶VSXUSRVHLVWo protect a 
claimant from the problem of a loss of privacy.  It would therefore seem that an injunction 
prohibiting defendants and others from disseminating private information that later becomes 
widely disseminated in any event represents a failed solution to the problem of protecting 
privacy.  Yet the MPI courts have responded to this apparent solution failure in a highly 
interesting way.   
 
The approach was first adopted in Giggs where the injunction as a solution to a problem 
seemed to have IDLOHGGLVVHPLQDWLRQRI*LJJV¶LGHQWLW\DQGKLVDIIDLUarguably increased as a 
result of the litigation.  This failure was indirectly acknowledged by Tugendhat J, who 
claimed: 
 
µIt is obvious that if the purpose of this injunction were to preserve a secret, 
it would have failed in its purpose.   But in so far as its purpose is to 
prevent intrusion or harassment, it has not failed.¶129 
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Two points of interest emerge from this statement.  First Tugendhat J LPSOLHVWKDWµNHHSLQJD
VHFUHW¶ZDVQRWQHFHVVDULO\WKHLQMXQFWLRQ¶VDLPµLI¶<HWDVHFUHWXQGHUVWRRGDVVRPHWKLQJ
that is kept hidden or concealed130 was surely a key aim of the Giggs injunctions, and indeed 
all MPI injunctions.  Selective concealment and exposure, a degree of control over the 
information we reveal about ourselves to others, is viewed as a crucial aspect of modern 
liberal understandings of privacy.131  Second, Tugendhat J indicated that the purposes of 
keeping a secret and preventing intrusion are two distinct, separable aims, and that one can 
fail whilst the other succeeds.  7KLV GLVWLQFWLRQ LQIRUPHG WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V UHFHQW
approach in the PJS dispute.  
 
The distinction in PJS v News Group 
In PJS the majority Law Lords also drew a crucial distinction in the very core of the Article 8 
privacy right itself, which enabled them to justify continuing the PJS injunction despite 
widespread dissemination.  Lords Mance and Neuberger drew upon the comments of 
Tugendhat and Eady Js in Giggs 132  and maintained a distinction between two core 
components of Article 8: confidentiality and intrusion.133 
 
The first confidentiality aspect of privacy entails maintaining a secret, seeking to protect 
DJDLQVW µXQZDQWHG DFFHVV WR SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ¶134  and this is arguably associated with 
03,¶V EUHDFK RI FRQILGHQFH RULJLQV  Lord Neuberger conceded that due to widespread 
dissemination, this first aspect of the claimDQW¶V FDVH ZDV weak, though (interestingly) not 
futile:  
 
µIf 3-6¶VFDVHZDVVLPSO\EDVHGRQFRQILGHQWLDOLW\RUVHFUHF\WKHQZKLOH
I would not characterise his claim for a permanent injunction as hopeless, 
it would have substantial difficulties¶135  
 
A second component of privacy, intrusion, was distinguished from confidentiality.  This 
HQWDLOV µXQZDQWHG DFFHVV WR >RU LQWUXVLRQ LQWR@RQH¶V « SHUVRQDO VSDFH¶136 and is also the 
concern of privacy.137  This element was said to be concerned with preventing µLQYDVLYHQHss 
and distreVV¶WRLQGLYLGXDOV138  Though the Supreme Court judgment did not elaborate upon 
this further, it indirectly referenced passages of leading text Tugendhat & Christie that 
indicate this second aspect of Article 8 is concerned with physical privacy.  Tugendhat & 
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Christie lists various activities that violate physical privacy, including: telephoto lens 
photography; filming someone against their wishes; following a person or pursing them for 
an interview.139  The passage thus directly covers press hounding and paparazzi activity, yet 
this physical understanding of intrusion was merely afforded fleeting mention by the Law 
Lords,140 only becoming apparent as a background influence upon further examination.  In 
any event the /DZ/RUGV¶WUHDWPHQWRIµLQWUXVLRQ¶Zas ambiguous because there seemed to be 
a second understanding RI µLQWUXVLRQ¶ at play; new individual intrusions would result from 
additional repetition of personal information,141  each reiteration causing another harm to the 
claimant.  This form of intrusion indicates that it is not merely understood with reference to 
SK\VLFDO VSDFH EXW DOVR LQ D PRUH SHUVRQDO µQRQ-SK\VLFDO¶ VHQVH  6XSSRUW IRU WKLV ODWWHU
meaning can be found in Tugendhat & Christie142 and in 6RORYH¶VDFFRXQW of intrusion.143 
    
The proposition that each repetition of private information creates another intrusion is a 
crucial development because it directly inverts the legal effect of the traditional public 
domain proviso as set out by Lord Goff in Spycatcher.  Thus as information becomes 
disseminated more widely, harmful intrusion actually increases in quantity as a result.  The 
quantitative approach dismissed as too limited in the context of secrecy is re-deployed in 
relation to intrusion.  The process of disseminating private information thus shifts from being 
a factor that undermines the cODLPDQW¶VFDVH LQWRD IDFWRU that actively favours DFODLPDQW¶V
case.  It is this second intrusional component of privacy that the Law Lords privileged 
throughout PJS whilst marginalising the first confidence-based element.  This enabled Lord 
Neuberger to claim that while the sHFUHF\ DVSHFW RI 3-6¶V FODLP KDG EHHQ µundoubtedly 
severely undermined (and probably, but not necessarily demolished)¶ KH GRXEWHG that the 
intrusion-based claim had EHHQ µsubstantially reduced [in]  strength¶ 144   So under this 
approach, as the µsecrecy¶ claim dissipates with the spread of private information, the 
µintrusion¶ claim undergoes an inversely proportionate strengthening.  This means that in 
IXWXUHVLPLODUFDVHVWKHFODLPDQW¶V$UWLFOHFODLPZLOOEHunaffected by how widely known 
his private information is  (DG\ -¶V FRPPHQWV LQ Giggs that widespread publication 
VWUHQJWKHQHG UDWKHU WKDQ GLPLQLVKHG WKH FODLPDQW¶V FDVH IRU DQ LQMXQFWLon145 supports this 
reading.  
 
The crucial inversion of wide dissemination from an anti-claimant factor into a pro-claimant 
factor in MPI claims has significant consequences for the viability of injunctions.  The 
change of emphasis from maintaining secrecy to restricting instances of intrusion entails a 
subtle but profound shift in the purpose and justification of privacy-protecting injunctions, 
and thus ± in turn ± the standard by which their success is gauged.  So when privacy is 
understood as the need to keep private information secret, widespread online publication of 
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that information inevitably entails a loss of control over it; the injunction as a solution to this 
problem has not successfully achieved its purpose.  7XJHQGKDW-¶VFODLm (outlined above) that  
if the injunction was intended to keep a secret it had failed acknowledges this, and was 
quoted with approval by both Lords Mance and Neuberger in PJS.146  But in PJS and Giggs, 
the courts marginalised this aspect and instead shifted to emphasise privacy understood as 
restricting the intrusive repetition of private information; the injunction was thus able to 
achieve this more modest aim simply by acting to limit its repetition more effectively than if 
no injunction was in place.  Lord Neuberger made this very point, claiming that PJS and his 
family would be subject to greater intrusion if the injunction was not continued.  As well as 
limiting press intrusion, he argued that the injunction would have some effect on Internet 
dissemination because it would make the story more difficult to find,147 thus indicating a 
potential concern for both physical paparazzi-based intrusion and µrepetition of information¶ 
intrusion. 
 
By claiming that the claimant would be subject to more intrusion without an injunction, 
courts can maintain that it has not failed and remains worthwhile RU µVHUYHV D XVHIXO
SXUSRVH¶.148  The problem is changed, the injunction successfully solves this new problem 
and, perhaps, the law saves face.  Yet, as discussed, the extent to which MPI injunctions are 
able to limit µUHSHWLWLRQRI LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ intrusion is questionable.  Part 1.2 established that 
private information was nonetheless widely repeated despite the PJS injunction.  
Additionally, MPI injunctions are not the only means to restrict physical press intrusion; for 
example, the Harassment Act 1997 was employed effectively to restrain aggressive and 
deplorable press hounding in Hong v XYZ.149   
 
 
Ultimately, one must question the extent to which the two aspects of privacy ± secrecy and 
intrusion - are neatly and conveniently separable as the Law Lords suggested.  This is 
particularly in light of the apparent dual meaning of intrusion itself; it seems to encompass 
press hounding and intrusive repetition, the latter of which bears a remarkable resemblance 
(in form but not favour) to the µsecrecy¶ WKDW it displaced.  As with the Supreme Court 
PDMRULW\¶V GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ RQOLQH DQG SUHVV GLVVHPLQDtion, Lord Toulson implicitly 
GLVVHQWHGRQWKHPDMRULW\¶s splitting of privacy.  He did not distinguish between confidence 
and intrusion, but viewed privacy as a unified whole.  Thus a degree of confidentiality was 
central if a privacy-protecting injunction was to continue: 
   
µWKH VWRU\¶V FRQILGHQWLDOLW\ KDV EHFRPH VR SRURXV WKDW WKH LGHD RI LW VWLOO
remaining a secret in a meaningful sense is illusory.  Once it has become 
readily available to anyone who wants to know it, it has lost the essence of 
confidentiality.¶150   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Though in most cases MPI injunctions remain effective, they have on occasion led to 
unintended consequences.  In these cases injunctions created perverse incentives by 
increasing the desire of audiences to know the restricted information and/or instigating 
counter-responses from groups whose values strongly oppose such censorship.  Though such 
dynamics are by no means a new phenomenon, they have been exacerbated by Internet 
technologies that make communication of information quicker, easier, more widespread and 
fluid. 
 
The specific effects of MPI injunction censorship in an online context do not appear to have 
been subject to empirical study and could arguably benefit from further inter-disciplinary 
research.  Building on the Worchel censorship studies, such research could provide a greater 
understanding of the factors that increase the likelihood of injunctions creating perverse 
incentives.  Its findings could provide a basis for more effective use of injunctions, e.g. 
providing guidance on the appropriate conditions in which to issue them and their precise 
terms.  But Merton also cautions us to be attuned of the limits of purposive human action and 
to the possibility that, in any event, legal edicts may fail or backfire in a world over which 
lawmakers and other actors have limited control. 
 
Because judges are unable to address the root causes of unintended consequences of MPI 
injunctions it is likely that similar episodes could occur in the future.  Instead, the judicial 
response to unintended consequences has been to modify the problem that MPI injunctions 
seek to address, and thus their intended purpose and outcome.  Hence a crucial shift from 
restricting the dissemination of private information (maintaining secrecy) to the more modest 
objective of serving a useful purpose by limiting both press hounding and the dissemination 
of private information more than if no injunction was in place (limiting intrusion).  But even 
the achievement of this modest aim relies on a recently-constructed and tenuous distinction 
between press and Internet dissemination.  This distinction entails the courts marginalising 
WKHZLGHVSUHDGRQOLQHGLVVHPLQDWLRQRISULYDWHLQIRUPDWLRQDQGLJQRULQJLWVLQHYLWDEOHµRII-
OLQH¶ FURVV-over.   This underplaying of the immense quantitative reach of Internet media 
JORVVHV RYHU WKH HVVHQWLDO IDLOXUHV RI 03, RUGHUV DW OHDVW LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKHLU µPDLQWDLQLQJ
VHFUHF\¶ IXQFWLRQ, but arguably, WKHLU µOLPLWLQJ LQWUXVLYH UHSHWLWLRQ¶ IXQFWLRQ DOVR.  This 
approach enables the courts to justify the continuation of MPI injunctions in the face of 
widespread defiance.  Where an injunction faces unintended consequences such reactions 
now act to strengthen the arguments favouring the injunction, meaning they can remain in 
force even where private information is widely publicised.  But, as Browne-Wilkinson V-C, 
Lord Toulson151   and the Court of Appeal in PJS have warned, this arguably does risk 
VDFULILFLQJVRPHRIWKHODZ¶VZLGHUFUHGLELOLW\LQWKHSURFHVV 
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